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The Impact of Insurance Prices on Decision-Making Biases: 
An Experimental Analysis 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 Individual decisions about whether to wear a seatbelt or purchase a smoke detector can 
affect the probability of experiencing a loss and making a claim on insurance.  Bond and Crocker 
(1991) show that when consumption is correlated with risks, efficiency can be increased by 
endogenous categorization, classifying risks on the basis of the insured’s consumption decisions.  
In Bond and Crocker’s model, individuals and insurers both understand the relationship between 
consumption decisions and the consumer’s expected losses.  In many instances, however, 
individuals are unlikely to understand the risks associated with their decisions, resulting in 
inefficient choices.  We test whether endogenous risk categorization increases efficiency in a 
different way than proposed by Bond and Crocker.  With endogenous categorization, insurance 
prices contain information that may allow consumers to make better-informed decisions.  This 
paper describes an experiment that tests whether showing subjects actuarially fair insurance 
prices reduces deviations from optimal (Bayesian) decision-making. 
 Many studies of individual decision-making have shown that people often use simple 
rules-of-thumb, or heuristics, when solving complicated problems1.  Because of bounded 
rationality, time constraints, or other limitations, individuals cannot or do not utilize all relevant 
information.  The reliance on heuristics may produce biases in individual decisions.  In one 
frequently cited example, Grether (1980) finds evidence that people give less weight to base 
rates than Bayes' Rule requires when solving statistical problems that require them to weigh prior 
information and sample information. 
In many naturally occurring contexts, however, individuals are able to insure themselves 
against risk. In these situations, they do not have to rely merely upon prior probabilities of loss or 
sample information. They also observe insurance prices before determining what action to take 
and whether or not to purchase insurance against potential loss.  If the relative prices of 
insurance contracts correctly reflect the relative probability of loss, the price of each contract 
                                                 
1 See Camerer, 1995, Davis and Holt, 1993, and Kleindorfer, Kunreuther, and Schoemaker, 1993, for surveys of 
these studies.  For studies of decision-making in insurance markets, see Camerer and Kunreuther, 1989; McClelland, 
Schulze and Coursey, 1993; and Shapira and Venizia, 1999. 
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may be an important signal of the risk of each choice or activity.  Consider, for example, the 
decision of whether to quit smoking.  There is a wealth of information available about the health 
consequences of smoking, but Viscusi (1990) has shown that individual assessments of the risks 
from smoking are often biased.  In the United Kingdom, the Stalwart Insurance Company offers 
higher annuity payments for smokers than for non-smokers (Investors Chronicle, 1995).  For 
someone who understands what this higher monthly payment means, this is a dramatic signal of 
the mortality risk associated with smoking.  A second example is the decision of whether to strap 
down a water heater in an earthquake prone area.  These measures are not frequently adopted 
(Palms et al, 1990) suggesting that people do not believe such measures are effective 
(Kunreuther, 1996).  Reduced premiums on insurance policies that specify strapping down the 
water heater may help to convey this information about effectiveness.  We address the question 
of whether companies who sell endogenously-priced insurance also create a byproduct - 
information - that allows people to better understand risk and therefore to make better decisions. 
 This paper describes an experiment that introduces a simple insurance option into El-
Gamal and Grether’s (1995) test of Bayesian updating.  We focus on the information that 
insurance markets create and disseminate in the form of prices. In particular, we address the 
question of whether allowing subjects to purchase actuarially fair insurance reduces deviations 
from Bayesian updating. We are interested in whether decisions are more consistent with Bayes' 
Rule when subjects are given the option to purchase insurance. We examine whether those who 
are not allowed to purchase, but who can observe posted prices for the insurance, also make 
better decisions than those who never observe insurance prices. 
In an environment in which biases are likely to arise, we study whether introducing 
insurance reduces the prevalence of biases or the kinds of biases that are observed.  We use an 
experiment, described in the next section, in which others have found systematic deviations from 
Bayesian updating. Sections 3 and 4 present an overview and statistical analysis, respectively, of 
the decision rules used by individuals in different insurance treatments.  Section 5 considers the 
decision to purchase insurance, and the final section concludes. 
2.  THE DECISION-MAKING ENVIRONMENT 
Procedures and Subjects 
We began with the procedures used by Grether (1980) and El-Gamal and Grether (1995) 
in which subjects guessed from which cup a sample was drawn, and could maximize expected 
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earnings by making decisions in accordance with Bayes' Rule.  Next, we introduced a simple 
insurance market in which subjects could purchase a policy that fully reimbursed them for the 
penalty assessed when an incorrect decision is made.  The posted prices of insurance for each 
cup accurately reflected the Bayesian posterior odds that each cup was used; therefore, the cost 
of insurance was lower for the cup with the highest posterior odds. 
The experiment was implemented in the following manner.2 Two cups were used, marked 
A and B.  The contents of the cups were as follows (where O denotes an orange ball and W 
denotes a white ball): 
Cup A: O O O O W W 
Cup B:  O O O W W W 
Subjects were given a $23 endowment and told that a sample would be drawn with 
replacement, from one of the two cups (determined by the roll of a six-sided die).  For example, 
at the start of Round 1 subjects were told that Cup A would be used if the die throw was 1, 2, 3, 
4, or 5; Cup B would be used if the die throw was a 6.  After announcing this prior probability, 
the die was thrown behind a screen and the appropriate cup was selected based on this die roll.3  
The cup's contents were placed into an opaque bucket and the experimenter then drew six balls 
with replacement from the bucket, showing and publicly recording each draw as it occurred.  
Subjects then guessed which cup was used. If the subject was correct, the subject kept the $23 
endowment; otherwise, $14 was deducted, and final earnings were $9.  These payoffs correspond 
to a situation in which either choice may result in a loss, but the probability of incurring a loss is 
endogenously determined by the particular choice made.4  This process was repeated 16 times 
without feedback.  Earnings were determined by one decision chosen at random after all 
decisions were made. A student monitor verified that all of the procedures were properly 
followed as described in the instructions. 
In sessions that included an insurance option, participants were told that in some rounds 
they would be able to purchase insurance that would fully reimburse them for the $14 loss 
resulting from an incorrect guess.  The instructions read: "the insurance prices were calculated in 
                                                 
2 Instructions for both of our treatments are available on the web at http://dmsweb.badm.sc.edu/mmcinnes/ 
3 There were 16 rounds in the experiment and the prior probability for Cup A followed a predetermined, but 
unannounced, sequence:  5/6, 2/3, 1/3, 5/6, 1/3, 2/3, 5/6, 2/3, 1/3, 5/6, 1/3, 2/3, 5/6, 2/3, 1/3, 5/6. 
 
4 We framed earnings in terms of losses to be consistent with the natural interpretation of insuring against a loss. 
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such a way that, if we repeated the experiment enough times, on average the insurance would 
reimburse to you exactly the amount that you paid for the insurance."5 After the sample was 
drawn, insurance prices were posted for each cup.  Those subjects who could purchase insurance 
made two choices: which cup was used, and whether to purchase insurance for this choice.  
About half of the subjects were allowed to purchase insurance in each round (but they were not 
told in advance in which rounds they would be able to purchase the insurance).  One group of 
subjects was able to purchase in the first 5 rounds but not in the remaining 11, while the other 
group was able to purchase in the last 11 rounds but not in the first five.  Therefore, those who 
could not purchase insurance in most rounds were still given prior experience with looking at 
insurance prices and deciding whether or not to purchase insurance.  Moreover, all subjects were 
required to write down the insurance prices to be sure that all observed them. 
Overall, 88 subjects participated in 11 sessions (an additional 11 people served as 
monitors, one in each session); 28 participants were in five control (no insurance) sessions, while 
the remaining 60 subjects participated in six insurance sessions (32 of these subjects were given 
the option to purchase insurance in the last 11 rounds).  All sessions were conducted at the 
University of South Carolina.  Participants were recruited from undergraduate business classes 
and through flyers posted across the campus.  About half of the subjects were business or 
economics majors.  They ranged in age from 17 to 47, with an average age of 21. 
Decision Rules and Heuristics 
A specific example demonstrates how Bayes' rule may be used to compute the posterior 
probability that a given cup was used, as well as how heuristics may lead to a different (or 
identical) decision.6  Suppose that Cup A is used with probability 2/3, and Cup B is used with 
probability 1/3.  If the sample draw is 3 orange balls and 3 white balls, this is "representative" of 
Cup B because the draw exactly matches the contents of this cup.  If the subject under-weights 
the base probability that Cup A was twice as likely to be used as Cup B, the representative 
heuristic (also known as base right bias) may lead to the conclusion that Cup B was used.  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
5 Although actuarially fair insurance is not prevalent outside of the lab, we wanted to reduce confusion or skepticism 
about how insurance prices were calculated. 
 
6 See Miller, 1956, and Newell and Simon, 1972, for early work on heuristics; Kleindorfer, Kunreuther, and 
Schoemaker, 1993, provide a more recent review. 
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However, the correct Bayesian posterior probability that Cup A was used is 0.584. 
Alternatively, the conservative heuristic predicts that subjects anchor too strongly on the 
base rate and fail to update their probabilities to reflect sample information.  Suppose instead that 
the sample draw was 2 orange and 4 white balls.  In this case, the Bayesian posterior probability 
that Cup A was used is 0.413, so Cup B should be chosen.  However, the conservative heuristic 
predicts that Cup A may be chosen because of the higher base probability, even when fewer than 
2 orange balls are drawn.7 
Table 1 summarizes these predictions.  An individual should select Cup A whenever the 
Bayesian posterior probability is greater than 0.5 and should select Cup B otherwise.  The 
representative heuristic tells us that Cup A will be chosen when the observed draw looks most 
like Cup A (2 or fewer white), and Cup B will be chosen if it looks like more Cup B (3 or more 
white).  The conservative heuristic predicts that one does not update the prior probability to a 
great enough extent based on the sample information, and so the Cup with the highest prior is 
chosen.  In addition, individuals may employ heuristics other than these; however, following El-
Gamal and Grether (1995), we limit our attention to this prominent subset of potential rules. 
Finally, consider how the insurance prices reflect the Bayesian posterior probabilities. 
Table 1 shows that when Cup A is used with a prior probability of 2/3 and 3 orange and 3 white 
balls are drawn, the posterior probability that Cup A was used is 0.584.  The price of insurance 
for those selecting cup A is equal to the expected loss of $14(0.416) = $5.82.  A subject who 
chooses Cup A must pay $5.82 to fully insure against a $14 loss, and will earn $23 - $5.82 = 
$17.18, whether or not Cup A was used.  If the subject chooses Cup B, the insurance will cost 
$8.18.  The fact that insurance costs more when Cup B is chosen reflects the fact that there is a 
higher expected loss associated with choosing Cup B than with Cup A.  The insurance prices for 
each prior and draw combination are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Summary of Decision Rules and Insurance Prices 
Draw 
(# orange) Prob(A|draw) 
Bayes' 
Rule Representative Conservative 
Insurance 
Price, A 
Insurance 
Price, B 
Prior Probability of Using Cup A = 1/3 
6 .737 A A B 3.68 10.32 
5 .584 A A B 5.82 8.18 
4 .413 B A B 8.22 5.78 
3 .260 B B B 10.36 3.64 
                                                 
7 See Edwards, 1968; Eger and Dickhaut, 1982; Armstrong, 1985; McKelvey and Page, 1990; and Griffin and 
Tversky, 1992. 
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2 .149 B B B 11.91 2.09 
1 .081 B B B 12.87 1.13 
0 .042 B B B 13.41 0.59 
Prior Probability of Using Cup A = 2/3 
6 .918 A A A 1.14 12.86 
5 .849 A A A 2.12 11.88 
4 .737 A A A 3.68 10.32 
3 .584 A B A 5.82 8.18 
2 .413 B B A 8.22 5.78 
1 .260 B B A 10.36 3.64 
0 .149 B B A 11.91 2.09 
Prior Probability of Using Cup A = 5/6 
6 .966 A A A 0.48 13.52 
5 .934 A A A 0.93 13.07 
4 .875 A A A 1.74 12.26 
3 .778 A B A 3.10 10.90 
2 .637 A B A 5.08 8.92 
1 .467 B B A 7.46 6.54 
0 .305 B B A 9.73 4.27 
 
3.  OVERVIEW OF INDIVIDUAL CHOICES 
 In this section we summarize the behavioral patterns that emerged, focusing on whether 
decisions in sessions in which insurance was offered differed from those in sessions without 
insurance.  We consider rounds in which use of the representative or conservative heuristic leads 
to a different choice than Bayesian updating would predict.  For example, when 3 orange and 3 
white balls are drawn and the prior is 2/3, both Bayes' Rule and the conservative heuristic predict 
Cup A will be chosen (see Table 1).  If a subject instead chooses Cup B, this is identified as a 
representative decision.  In rounds where all three rules agree but the subject chooses the 
opposite cup, we label this decision simply as "other." 
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Figure 1 shows the aggregate incidence of these choices.  In sessions in which no 
insurance was offered (columns labeled “No Insurance”) there were 136 draws in which a 
representative decision could be identified; of these, 38 (27.9%) were consistent with the 
representative heuristic.  The incidence of conservative decisions was lower: just 21.6% (out of 
51 possible times).  El Gamal and Grether (1995) also find that the most common form of non-
Bayesian decision-making is representative followed by conservative.  This pattern is reversed 
for subjects who observed insurance prices.  Those in the second group of columns observed 
insurance prices but were not allowed to purchase the insurance (combining observations from 
all rounds).  Those in the “Can Buy Insurance” columns observed the insurance prices and were 
allowed to purchase insurance.  About 75 percent of subjects who were given the opportunity to 
purchase insurance chose to do so.  The 25% who chose not to purchase are in the “Do Not 
Buy,” columns.  In every insurance treatment conservative decisions are made more frequently 
than representative decisions.  This suggests that observing insurance prices may alter decisions 
even if individuals choose not to buy or are not allowed to purchase insurance. 
 Subjects who are allowed to purchase insurance make fewer representative and 
conservative decisions.  In this sense, we find evidence that endogenously priced insurance does 
improve efficiency in our experiments.  However, anyone who purchases insurance should 
0
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Figure 1.  Observed Frequency of Non-Bayesian Decisions
Representative
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always choose the cup predicted by Bayes' Rule.8  Given this, a more stringent test of the effect 
of insurance prices would be to compare those who chose not to insure (“Do Not Buy" column) 
with those who do not observe insurance prices.  Representative and conservative heuristics are 
used with about the same frequency among subjects who never observed insurance prices and 
those who chose not to buy, while the rate at which subjects made decisions inconsistent with 
any of these rules was about double for those who chose not to buy insurance.  Therefore, the 
insurance market did not improve decision-making among those who chose not to purchase 
insurance. 
One explanation for this is the self-selection involved in the decision not to purchase 
insurance.  If a person believes that the "wrong cup" (from the standpoint of Bayes’ rule) is more 
likely to have been used, then one may perceive that the actuarially fair insurance is overpriced, 
given one’s own subjective beliefs.  For example, if several draws that look like Cup A have 
been observed, a draw of 3 orange and 3 white may confirm one’s belief that Cup B is “due” 
even if the subject understands that the objective posterior probability of B is below one-half.  In 
this event, the subject may choose not to purchase insurance and instead select the cup believed 
to be more likely. 
In order to avoid these selection issues, we also compare those who observe insurance 
prices but are not allowed to purchase (Cannot Buy) with those in the no insurance sessions.  
Here, the results are mixed.  Representative decision-making by those who observe insurance 
prices is reduced relative to that in the no insurance sessions (19.3 percent of those who observed 
prices made representative errors, compared with 27.9 percent in the no insurance sessions).  
However, there is a much higher incidence of conservative decision-making among this group 
(35.1 percent for those who observed prices, versus 21.6 percent for those who did not). It 
appears that posting prices for actuarially fair insurance increased the focus on base rates (and 
therefore the use of the conservative heuristic).  To explore this more carefully, the following 
section presents estimation of the decision-rules used in each treatment. 
 
                                                 
8  When one purchases insurance, earnings are equal to $23 (the initial endowment) minus the price of insurance for 
the cup that is chosen. To maximize earnings, a subject who purchases should always choose the cup with the lower 
price, which is the cup that has the highest Bayesian posterior probability.  Overall, subjects who purchased 
insurance chose consistently with Bayes' rule about 98 percent of the time. 
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4.  ESTIMATION OF DECISION RULES 
We estimate the decision rules employed by subjects in these experiments using the cut-
point analysis described in El-Gamal and Grether (1995).  The idea is that one uses a cutoff rule, 
which is a function of the prior and the draw, when deciding whether to choose Cup A or Cup B.  
This is a natural class of decisions rules to consider that includes both Bayes’ Rule and the 
conservative and representative heuristics.  For example, when the prior probability of using Cup 
A is 1/3 Bayes' Rule predicts that a subject will choose Cup A if more than four orange balls are 
drawn (i.e., when the posterior probability on A rises above 50 percent, as shown in Table 1).  
So, under this prior, a sample of 4 orange balls is the “cut-point” after which the subject will 
switch from choosing B to A.  This is shown in the first row of Table 2. 
Table 2.  Predicted Cut Points 
 Cut-Point for 
Pr(A) = 1/3 
Cut-Point for 
Pr(A) = 2/3 
Cut-Point for 
Pr(A) = 5/6 
Bayes' 
Rule 
 
4 
 
2 
 
1 
Representative  3 
 
3 
 
2, 3 
Conservative 5, 6 -1, 0, 1 -1, 0 
A cut-point specifies that Cup A is chosen if the number of orange balls drawn is 
greater than the specified number for a given prior. 
 
Taking all combinations of draws for the three priors yields a total of 512 possible cutoff 
rules.  Table 2 shows the cut-points for the three most prominent rules: Bayesian updating, the 
representative heuristic, and the conservative heuristic.  The strong form of representative 
decision-making predicts that one will choose Cup A when more than 3 orange balls are drawn, 
regardless of the prior.  A weaker form of the representative heuristic considers the prior but still 
gives too much weight to the sample.  For example, if the prior for A is 5/6 and we observe 
subjects using a cut-point of 2, this behavior is consistent with over-weighting the sample 
information and is identified as a representative decision rule.  At an extreme, a conservative 
subject would ignore the sample and always choose Cup A when the prior for A is greater than 
1/2.  A weaker form of conservative decision-making predicts that the prior will receive too 
much weight but the sample draw will also influence the choice.   
 We use the observed choices made by subjects to infer the actual cut-point employed for 
each of the three priors used in our experiments.  We assume that a subject "trembles" when 
 10
applying the rule (randomly chooses between A and B) with probability g.  Thus, a subject's 
decision will disagree with the rule with probability g/2.  The error rate g is assumed to be the 
same for all subjects in all rounds.  Given a subject's decisions in each round, (x1, x2, ... , xt), the 
likelihood of the rule c and error rate g is given by 
where t is the number of decisions and Xc is a count of the number of times the subject's 
decisions agree with the rule c. 
Using maximum likelihood procedures, we estimated the rule that best fits our subjects' 
decisions.9   Results are shown in Table 3.  Recall, almost everyone who purchased insurance in 
these experiments chose consistently with Bayes' Rule; hence, there are few observations on 
subjects who were able to purchase insurance but chose not to.  Therefore, we limit our attention 
to those who never observed insurance prices ("No Insurance") and those who observed prices 
but were not allowed to purchase insurance. 
Table 3.  Estimated Decision Rulesa 
 Prior Probability of Using Cup A  
 1/3 2/3 5/6 Epsilon 
No Insurance B B R .25 
Observe Prices, Cannot Buy B B B/C .27 
a Cutoff rules consistent with Bayes’ Rule, the Representative heuristic, and the 
Conservative heuristic are denoted, respectively, B, R, C. 
In both treatments, the estimated cutoff rule is consistent with Bayes’ Rule when the prior 
is 1/3 and 2/3.  We can distinguish between these two treatments based on the estimates for the 
cut-point used when the prior on A is 5/6.  For those in the "No Insurance" treatment, this cut-
point is consistent with a representative heuristic.  For those who observe insurance prices but 
are not allowed to buy, the estimated cut-point does not distinguish between a conservative and a 
Bayesian cutoff rule.  Notice, however, that Bayes' Rule and the conservative heuristic dictate 
that the same cup will be chosen, except when five or six white balls are drawn.  Since we never 
observed such a draw when the prior on A was 5/6, the data are unable to distinguish between 
                                                 
9 The estimation algorithm checks all possible rules. The Gauss code that was used for all of the following 
estimation is available from the authors upon request.  While the standard regularity conditions for maximum 
likelihood are not met, El-Gamal and Grether (1995) state that the procedure yields consistent estimates and that the 
Likelihood Ratio test statistic is asymptotically distributed as Chi-squared. 
1 2( , ,..., ) 1 ,2 2
c cX t X
tf x x x
ε ε −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − ×⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
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these rules.10  The estimate of epsilon, shown in Table 3, shows that the rules are applied with 
about the same precision in both treatments (about 87 percent of the time).  The estimates are 
roughly comparable El-Gamal and Grether’s, which ranged from .22 to .31 in sessions in which 
subjects were financially motivated for their decisions.11 
  To test whether this difference in decision rules between treatments is significant, we 
conducted a likelihood ratio test of homogeneity between these two treatments.  The null 
hypothesis is that the epsilon and decision rules used are identical between treatments.  When a 
single decision rule is estimated, we reject the null hypothesis at the 10 percent level (chi-square 
= 7.97, with four degrees of freedom).  Thus, we conclude that the introduction of insurance 
price information has a significant effect on subjects’ decision rules, even when these subjects 
are not allowed to purchase the insurance.  Because the estimates of epsilon (the precision with 
which the decision rule is applied) are very similar between the two treatments, this difference 
appears to be accounted for by the different decision rule employed by these subjects in the 
extreme (5/6) probability condition. 
 
5.  The Insurance Purchase Decision 
We next turn our attention to the factors that influence the decision of whether to 
purchase insurance.  Recall that the insurance offered to subjects was actuarially fair (that is, the 
cost to the subject of purchasing insurance was equal to the expected loss), and this fact was 
emphasized in the instructions.  A risk-preferring individual should never purchase this 
insurance, and a risk neutral individual should be indifferent between purchasing and not.  
However, one who is risk averse is predicted to always purchase this insurance.  Pooling across 
subjects and decision rounds, insurance was purchased 74 percent of the time.  Only three of 60 
subjects never purchased insurance.  By contrast, 17 of 60 subjects always purchased insurance. 
Individual risk attitudes, especially when potential losses are at stake, are debated in the 
literature.  In a classic paper, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) present evidence in favor of risk 
                                                 
10 Neither of these draws occurred in any of the 66 samples using a prior on A of 5/6.  This was true both in the 
insurance and no insurance treatments. 
 
11  We also estimated the two most prominent decision rules used in each treatment.  The rule that provided the bet 
fit for the majority of subjects was the same as that reported in Table 3 (when only one rule was estimated).  
Moreover, an Information Criterion test proposed by El-Gamal and Grether (1995) shows that estimation of a single 
rule is sufficient. 
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seeking behavior when people are presented with lotteries over (hypothetical) losses.  
Kunreuther et al. (1978) give further support to the prevalence of risk-seeking in the domain of 
losses, showing that in actual insurance markets, few people buy highly subsidized earthquake 
and flood insurance.  However, several studies have also found that the purchase of full 
insurance is quite popular, which would indicate risk aversion when potential losses are at stake.  
McClelland, Schulze and Coursey (1993) show that individuals bid several times the expected 
loss to obtain full insurance.  Moreover, people frequently shun lower priced insurance with a 
deductible in favor of full insurance (Johnson et al., 1993, and Shapira and Venizia, 1999). 
The prevalence of insurance purchases is consistent with some degree of risk aversion.12  
About 60 percent of subjects purchased insurance in more than 2/3 of the rounds in which they 
were given the opportunity.  This is roughly comparable to the proportion of subjects identified 
as being risk averse (66 percent) by Holt and Laury (2002) using a lottery over gains. 
We next consider the circumstances in which individuals choose to purchase insurance in 
our experiments.  There is an inverse correspondence between the posterior probability and the 
price of insurance:  it costs a subject very little to insure when the posterior probability that a cup 
was used is very high.13  Fewer subjects bought insurance when the posterior probability was 
close to 50 percent.  When the posterior probability strongly favored one cup over the other, the 
price of insurance was lower, and more subjects purchased insurance (see Table 4, below).  In 
these situations, there is less uncertainty and subjects are more likely to be able to "solve the 
problem" and correctly choose the Cup that is favored by the posterior probability.  Because the 
posterior odds strongly favor this choice, it also carries lower risk.14  In fact, most non-Bayesian 
                                                 
12 Increasing the scale of the potential loss (rather than the likelihood of loss) increased the frequency with which 
insurance was purchased.  In pilot experiments, choosing the incorrect cup resulted in losing $6 of a $9 initial 
endowment (compared with losing $14 of the $23 endowment in the experiments reported here).  In these pilot 
sessions, insurance was purchased only about 50 percent of the time. This finding is similar to Bosch-Domenech and 
Silvestre (1999), who report that willingness to purchase actuarially fair insurance against losses increases in the 
scale of the loss. 
 
13 In insurance settings, the “price” of insurance is typically interpreted to be the difference between the expected 
loss and the premium.  Because the premium charged is just equal to the expected loss in our design, the “price” of 
insurance is zero.  Throughout this paper, we instead use price to mean the amount a subject paid to purchase 
insurance.   
 
14 When subjects choose not to insure, the risk associated with their cup choice can be measured as the standard 
deviation of the payoff conditional on their choice.  If the posterior probability of the chosen Cup is p, then the 
standard deviation is proportional to )p1(p − .  The standard deviation is maximized at p=0.5.  The posterior 
probability for the more likely cup varies between 0.5 and 1. 
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choices occur when the posterior probability is close to one-half.  A random effects regression of 
the percentage of subjects who buy insurance in a given round on the posterior probability of the 
most likely cup yields (standard errors of the coefficient estimates given in parentheses below the 
estimate): 
 percent buying =  .27 + .63 * posterior 
    (.10)  (.13) 
 
The coefficient for the posterior probability is significantly different than zero at any standard 
level of confidence. 
Table 4.  Percent Purchasing Insurance 
Prior Probability Most  
Likely Cup was Used Percent Buying Insurance 
.51 - .60 64 % 
.61 - .70 62 % 
.71 - .80 75 % 
.81 - .90 80 % 
.91 – 1.00 88 % 
Although many subjects purchase insurance (supporting the existence of risk aversion 
over losses), this inverse relationship between the probability of a loss and buying insurance is 
consistent with one of prospect theory's behavioral implications (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, 
and Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).  Specifically, risk-seeking behavior is predicted for high 
probabilities of loss, and risk-averse behavior may be observed when the probability of loss is 
low.  This is consistent with the fact that insurance is bought more frequently when the posterior 
probability is high (and therefore the probability of loss is low). 
At the conclusion of each experimental session, subjects were asked to complete a brief 
demographic questionnaire.  While not the focus of our experiments, it is useful to consider the 
effect of socioeconomic characteristics on the insurance purchase decision.  Despite evidence 
from other studies (Holt and Laury, 2002, and Eckel et al., 1998) that gender and other 
demographic characteristics may influence risk attitudes, the frequency with which an individual 
purchased insurance was not significantly related to any of these characteristics.  OLS 
regressions including characteristics such as age, gender, major, year in school, and the purchase 
of insurance outside of the lab (such as auto, renters, or health insurance) were not significant 
when estimated as a group or in univariate regressions.  We should note, however, that our 
design does not allow us to infer the degree of risk aversion.  If one is even slightly risk averse, 
that person should always purchase insurance.  Therefore, if both men and women are risk 
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averse, all should purchase insurance, regardless of whether one group is significantly more risk 
averse than the other.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Studies of individual decision-making have shown that people often use simple rules-of-
thumb, or heuristics, when solving complicated problems.  The end-result can be systematic 
biases in decisions.  An open question is whether the information provided by market forces can 
improve decisions in these contexts.  The preponderance of evidence is that markets reduce, but 
do not eliminate, these biases.15  This paper instead focuses on a different question: whether the 
market for insurance yields, as a byproduct, information that may reduce biases in making 
related decisions.  If insurers are better informed than consumers about the relationship between 
consumption choices and risk, then endogenous risk categorization may help to inform 
consumers about risk. 
We began by replicating El-Gamal and Grether’s experiment, in which we found 
evidence of decision-making biases.  We followed this by a treatment in which some subjects 
were given the option to purchase insurance at actuarially fair prices.  Other subjects observed 
the prices but were not allowed to purchase.  Those who were allowed to purchase made 
decisions that were largely consistent with Bayesian updating.  Because nearly 75 percent of 
these subjects chose to purchase insurance, it is not clear whether the insurance prices 
themselves improved decisions or if subjects simply wanted to insure and therefore chose the 
less expensive (and therefore “correct”) option.  In either case, subjects who were able to 
purchase insurance made better decisions (from the standpoint of Bayes’ Rule) than did those in 
our other treatments. 
When all priors are combined, those who observe the price of insurance but are not 
allowed to buy are less likely to make decisions consistent with a representative heuristic than 
those who do not observe prices.  However, they make conservative decisions more often.  
Maximum likelihood estimation of the decision rules used by subjects not allowed to purchase 
insurance (separated by treatment depending on whether they observed prices) finds that for 
                                                 
15 For implementations using asset markets, see Camerer, 1987 and 1990; Duh and Sunder, 1986; and Anderson and 
Sunder, 1995.  An exception is Ganguly, Kagel, and Moser (2000) who found that the market context increased the 
prevalence of biases. 
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priors closer to one-half, Bayes Rule provided a good fit.  When the prior probability of using 
Cup A was 5/6, we find a representative rule best describes choices for those who do not observe 
insurance prices.  However, for those who observe prices (but cannot buy), decisions are 
consistent with both Bayes’ Rule and the conservative heuristic.  
Finally, we find that most subjects who are able to purchase insurance choose to do so, 
although only 1/3 of subjects buy insurance in all rounds.  A larger percentage of subjects buy 
insurance when the posterior probability of that a cup was used is higher.  In other words, more 
subjects buy insurance when the probability of a loss is lower. 
The notion that price can serve as an informative signal is not new: many studies have 
shown that price may signal the quality of a good (in a market context) or inside information (in 
asset markets).16  In this paper, we consider whether people use the price of insurance associated 
with an underlying outcome to infer information about the likelihood of that outcome.  Our 
results indicate that subjects in the insurance session made choices that result in lower expected 
losses than did those in the sessions with no insurance market. 
                                                 
16 For price as a signal of quality, see Bagwell and Riordan (1991) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986).  For price as a 
signal of inside information in asset markets, see Forsythe and Lundholme (1990), Banks (1985), and Plott and 
Sunder (1982). 
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